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In the case of Citizens Committee to Recall Rizzo v. The Board
of Elections' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Tendered one of
the most extraordinary decisions of recent memory. The court
declared unconstitutional a provision of the Home Rule Charter of
Philadelphia for recall of elective officers at the behest of a mayor
who had twice sworn to "support" the charter as provided by that
instrument. In doing this the court ignored the elementary and
patent distinction between recall-a political process-and removal
for legal cause. Reliance was placed upon provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874 as to removal of public -officers, without any express reference to the fact that the 1922-home- rule
amendment to the constitution was later in adoption, and might
modify inconsistent existing provisions of the constitution.
Beyond all this, the court, without benefit of participation of
any other local units, laid it down ex mero motu for all such units
that they could not constitutionally provide for recall in liome rule
charters, and did so without reference to the language of the broad,
self-executing home rule amendment of 1968, and without examination of the home rule concept as to either the structure or
powers of local government.
All that the court need have done to dispose of the case as it
did was to hold that the board of elections, in rejjecting the recall
f Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Utah; Dean and Professor of
Law Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania Law School. A.B. 1926, M.A. 1929,
J.D. 1929, University of North Carolina; J.S.D. 1930, Yale University. Member,
New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania Bars.
1470 Pa. -, 367 A.2d 232 (1976).
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petition, had not abused its discretion by acting arbitrarily or fraudulently or pursuant to an erroneous view of the law. This is not to
say that such a conclusion would have been well supported. That
is a matter for further consideration in this commentary. It is
enough to say that had the court exercised such restraint the current recall effort would have failed, but that would have been all.
Instead, the court moved at large into the constitutional domain
and, by a judicial tour de force, removed any legal basis for another
recall try by concerned citizens short of adoption of an enabling
state constitutional amendment.
The recall, like the initiative and referendum, is an expression
of commitment to popular government that excited great interest in
this country early in this century. The three are described in an
early work on the subject:
By the initiative is meant the right of a stated percentage
of the voters, in any state or municipality, to propose both
constitutional and ordinary laws, and to require that, if
these be not enacted forthwith by the state or municipal
legislature, they shall be submitted for ratification to the
whole body of voters. By the referendum is meant the
right of a stated percentage of the voters to demand that
measures passed by the ordinary lawmaking bodies of the
state or municipality shall be submitted to the whole body
of voters for acceptance or rejection. By the recall is
meant the right of the electors in any state or municipality
to end by an adverse vote the term of any elective officer
before the expiration of the period for which he was
elected. 2
In the aggregate, the three processes expressed the conception that
both lawmaking and holding of elective public office are subject to
the popular will.
Of course, direct democracy is of ancient origin and has been
characteristic of American local government, particularly in New
England states, from the early days. 3 The complex condition of
contemporary society certainly does not preclude popular voice in
policy-making but does bespeak primary reliance upon elected
representatives. Even in New England, large towns have had to
resort to representative town meetings. The recall is keyed to representation as a mechanism by which an officer who does not have popular support may be removed. All of this is elementary to students
2lvlunro, Introductory in Tm INm'rrvE, R
3
See, e.g., J. SLY, TowN Gov mENT iw

,ymm-mum
AM REcAl.
MAssAcausUars

(1930).

1-2 (1912).
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of American state and local government. It appears necessary to
express it here since the majority in Citizens Committee to Recall
Rizzo ignored it.
Some further descriptive reference, in the light of state and
local experience, is in order. The recall process is more commonly
confined to elective offices for the obvious reason that incumbents
are directly accountable to the voters. This is clearest as to officers
in the executive branch, but availability as to members of the
legislative branch, particularly at the local level, is not uncommon.
In some jurisdictions even judicial officers are subject to recall.4
Application to appointive officers does not consist with the line of
accountability and may weaken the position of a responsible executive officerY
It is common knowledge, of course, that the recall does not
exist as to officers of the United States." Some thirteen state constitutions provide for it at the state level.7 Availability at the local
level is much more extensive.8 Local recall does not generally
depend upon express constitutional recognition because, apart from
express constitutional limitations or devolutions of authority to
local units, state legislative supremacy over local government is
very broad, if not complete. 9
4 See Fordham, The Utah Recall Proposal,1976 UTAH L. REV. 1, 35 nn.26 & 27.
Application to judges may be questioned as at odds with independence of judicial
action from influences other than the merits on the law and facts. Doubtless this is
why six states, in their constitutional provision for recall, except judges. Id. n.28.
5
Pennsylvania constitutional provisions as to removal ordain that appointive
officers, other than judges of courts of record, may be removed at the pleasure of
the power by which they shall have been appointed. PA. CONsT. art. VI, § 7.
This contrasts with recall of elective officers by the voters as a matter of accountability.
6
Recently there was the prospect of an impeachment trial of a president.
Resignation ended Congressional action. The experience led to suggestions of other
methods of removal. Representative Henry Reuss of Wisconsin came forward with
a vote-of-no-confidence proposal borrowed from parliamentary systems. This idea
was discussed in Symposium on the Reuss Resolution: A Vote of No Confidence in
the President, 43 GEo. WAsm L. Rev. 327 (1975). This writer took note in that
commentary of the possibility of recall of a president without espousing it. Fordham,
The No Confidence Vote Proposalis a Dubious Idea, id. 372.
7ALis. CoNsr. art. XI, § 8; A=az. CoNsT. art. VIII, §§ 1-6; CAr. CoNsT. art. II,
§§ 1-6; COLO. CONsT. art. XXI §§ 1-2; IDAnro CoNsT. art. VI, § 6; KAN. CoNsT. art.
IV, §§ 3-5; LA. CoNsT. art. X, § 26; Mim CoNsr. art. II, § 8; NEv. CoxsT. art. 2,
§ 9; N.D. CoNsT. art. 33; Onn. CoNsr. art. I, § 18; WASH. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 33-34;
Wis. CoNsr. art. XII, § 12.
8 No attempt has been made to identify all the states in which local recall
exists, but a review of the case law confirms that the number is very considerable.
9 The proposition was put in the strongest terms in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,
207 U.S. 161 (1907). More recent experience dictates considerable qualification.
For example, changes in local governmental jurisdiction and structure may be found
not to consist with federal constitutional guarantees, notably those of the post-Civil
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Whether recall is a meritorious device under any standard is
not the direct concern of this paper. Once adopted, it may well be
said that the courts should embrace the view that the law governing
recall should be liberally interpreted in favor of the exercise of
political voice by the electorate. The basis for this is that the recall
is a democratic process that affords the voters structured opportunity
to review the position of incumbent elective officials. It is obvious
that the probabilities of some departure from the strict letter of the
law in the pre-election recall process are substantial. Judicial exaction of rigid compliance with the letter of the law can have the
effect of suppressing voter voice. It is doubtless such considerations
that have led the courts generally to engage in liberal interpretation of law governing recall. 10 A contrary view has been taken in
Louisiana on the basis that recall is a harsh remedy.1 1 This is
hardly compelling; the object of recall is not to punish or to provide
redress but to serve the public interest as the voters perceive it.
Some of the legal questions of current concern with respect to
the recall were raised in the early years of recall experience. The
principal ones had to do with whether the recall was a political
process not keyed to legal cause and the authority of the cognizant
officer with respect to the sufficiency of a recall petition. It can be
safely said that for the most part the judicial response was (1) that
recall is a political process, not grounded in legal cause,' 2 and (2)
that the cognizant officer's determination as to sufficiency of a recall
petition was final subject only to judicial correction of action that
was capricious or arbitrary and, as such, abuse of discretion, or was
13
plainly erroneous as a matter of law.
The Philadelphia experience does not suggest that the overhang of amenability to recall has been a significant factor in the
political life of that large city. The petition signatories requirement of twenty-five per centum of the number who voted for mayor
War Amendments. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
(Legislation so
redrawing Alabama city boundary as to exclude black citizens held violative of
fifteenth amendment. Patently, equal protection of the law was denied as well.)
10 This view was taken in the leading eases of Dunham v. Ardenj, 43 Okla.
619, 143 P. 381 (1914) and Topping v. Houston, 94 Neb. 445, 143 N.W. 796
(1913). See also In re Rice, 35 Ill. App. 2d 79, 94, 181 N.E.2d 742, 749 (1962)
& cases cited therein.
" Cloud v. Dyess, 172 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 1965).
12 This was clearly perceived in early cases. Dunham v. Ardery, 43 Okla. 619,
143 P. 381 (1914); Topping v. Houston, 94 Neb. 445, 143 N.W. 796 (1913);
Hilzinger v. Gillman, 56 Wash. 228, 105 P. 471 (1909). It finds support in the
more recent cases as well. In re Bower, 41 Ill. 2d 277, 242 N.E.2d 252 (1968);
Westpy v. Burnett, 82 N.J. Super. 239, 197 A.2d 400 (1964); Wallace v. Tripp,
358 Mich. 668, 101 N.W.2d 312 (1960).
13 Dunham v. Ardery, 43 Okla. 619, 143 P. 381 (1914).
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in the latest prece-ding mayoralty election is a reasonably demanding
one. The effort to recall Rizzo is the first genuine recall battle, so
far as the writer is advised, in twenty-five years under the charter.
I. Ti

RECALL PROCESS

Briefly put, it can be said that there are three principal
elements in recall. The first is the filing of a petition by voters for
a recall election against an identified public officer. The second is
administrative review of the petition to determine its sufficiency.
The third is the holding of a recall election.
The Philadelphia Home Rule Charter makes any person holding an elective office of the city subject to removal from office at a
recall election. Action is initiated by petition signed by registered
electors. To be sufficient, a petition must contain, in the case of an
officer elected from the city at large, signatures equal in number to
at least twenty-five per centum of the vote cast for mayor in the
latest preceding mayoralty election, collected within a sixty day
period.' 4 Once a Philadelphia recall petition has been accepted by
the cognizant board for filing, the incumbent may elect to resign
and, thus, put an end to the process. 15 Further provisions govern
the conduct of recall elections, a matter not pursued here since the
Rizzo proceeding did not get that far.16
What happened was that the cognizant board of elections, after
obtaining several extensions of time from the Court of Common
Pleas, ruled the petition invalid and rejected it. Whereupon the
Citizens Committee to Recall Rizzo, which spearheaded the recall
movement, sought mandamus in the Court of Common Pleas to
compel the board to file the recall petition and order a recall
election. Shortly thereafter Mayor Rizzo was permitted to intervene
as a defendant. The trial court granted the writ.
There was no basis for objection to the standing of the incumbent mayor to challenge the sufficiency of the recall petition.
He was, and is, free to insist that the charter requirements as to a
recall petition be met as a condition to the holding of a recall
election and to litigate the issues, as well. The challenge of the
mayor to the constitutionality of the home rule charter provisions
for the recall was another matter. He was twice elected subject to
the provisions of the home rule charter and in both instances took
the charter-mandated oath "to support" the charter. He had en14

Mm.ADELPA Houm RuLE CxMm,

'5 Id. § 9-103.

26 Id. §§

9-101 to 9-103.

§§ 9-100 to 9-101.
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joyed the benefits of the office of mayor under the charter. On
what, basis was he to be heard to challenge. the validity of the
organic law within the framework of which he was elected to and
occupied the office of mayor? The answer must be "none." And
so it was held in the only pertinent case -that the writer has been
abletoidentify.T Surely it is most extraordinary that a court would
entertain and uphold attack by a public officer upon the very
organic law that was the foundation of his office and his tenure.
Unlike recall systems that exist in some states, that of Philadelphia does not exact that petitioners make charges or set out
reasons or grounds for recall. Where there is such a requirement,
itis likely to be accompanied by a provision for response by an
officer who is the object of a recall petition. So it is under the
Nevada Constitution. 8 All this is not a matter of proof. The
voters are given something to go upon and they can make of it what
they will.' 9 The petitioners must state reasons or grounds but they
bear no burden to prove. In short, the process remains plainly a
political one as distinguished from legal action grounded upon
cause 20 The State of Washington dispensation is of interest here.
The constitution of that state requires that a recall petition charge
conduct that constitutes malfeasance, misfeasance, or violation of
oath of office. 2 ' The state courts pass upon the sufficiency of a
petition inthis respect but do not go into the question of the truth
of the charges, or even of whether the charges were made in a good
faith, belief that they were true.22 In the Philadelphia situation
there is,
no requirement of articulation of charges, grounds or
reasons. The system simply fits the good old straight-issue-in or
out-recall model.
It is appropriate to inquire, at an early stage, whether recall in
any way transgresses limitations to be found in the Federal Constitution. The first thing to be noted is that there is no property or
contract element in a public office.28 Of course, an incumbent may
Roberts v. Brown, 43 Tenn. App. 567, 310 S.W.2d 197 (1957).
CONST. art. 2, § 9.
i '
19 See Batchelor v. Eighla Judicial Dist. Court, 81 Nev. 629, 408 P.2d 239
(1965).
20 It is of interest that the Michigan Constitution provides expressly that any
17

18NEV.

statement of reasons or grounds procedurally 'required in the recall'process shall
be a political question. MIcH. CONST. art. IL § 8.
21
22

WASH. CONsTr. art. I,

§§ 33-34.

Bocek v. Bayley, 81 Wash. 2d 831, 505 P.2d 814 (1973); Citizens Against
Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d 121, 492 P.2d 536 (1972).
23
Higginbotham v. City of Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535 (1939).
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obtain legal protection against unlawful interference, 24 but, so far
as the Federal Constitution is concerned, the state may abolish an
office outright with impunity at mid-term. The due process and
contract clauses are no bar.25 As for procedural due process, there
may well be a serious question if removal is for legal cause, the
determination of which may reflect upon the individual, as, for
example, where removal is pursued on the ground of extortion. 26
But this has no relevance to removal as political action. Yet in
Citizens Committee to Recall Rizzo the Chief Justice perceived the
recall process as a denial of due process, presumably based upon the
notion that due process exacted that there be legal cause and opportunity to be heard.
This reasoning was rejected in the leading case of Gordon v.
Leatherman.2 7 There the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit rejected a due process attack in a Florida local recall
case comparable to Citizens Committee to Recall Rizzo on the
obvious basis that recall is political action by the voters, who may
be guided by whatever considerations, just as in the case of election
in the first instance. In Leatherman the court made the further
sententious observation:
Furthermore, there is a fundamental difference between the expulsion or removal of a public official by the
state and that same activity by the voters. The presence
of governmental action in McCarley and the other cases
cited in the district court opinion is alone sufficient to
distinguish them from the present case. Any governmental
body is required to act fairly, but that is not true as to a
voter. Insofar as the United States Constitution is concerned, an elector may vote for a good reason, a bad reason,
or for no reason whatsoever. That principle applies to
recall elections as it does to all other elections.2
II. JuDIcIAL REvEw

From the early days of recall in this country there has been
judicial authority that a signatory to a recall petition has standing
24
See Jarrett, De Facto Public Offlcers: The Validity of Their Acts and Their
Rights to Compensation, 9 S. CAr. L. REv. 189, 231-34 (1936) (de jure officer may
recover from de facto officer such compensation as has been paid the latter).
25
I-igginbotham v. City of Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535 (1939).
26
See, e.g., McCarley v. Sanders, 309 F. Supp. 8 (M.D. Ala. 1970). The court
in McCarley held that plaintiff state senator, who was charged with corruption, had
been denied due process in expulsion proceedings before a senate committee.
27450 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1971).
281d. 567.
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to seek mandamus against the cognizant officer or body to compel
the calling of a recall election. 2 9 By definition, of course, the writ
may not be used to control the exercise of discretion, but it may be
issued to correct arbitrary or fraudulent action or an erroneous
view of the law.30 There is authority that the action of the officer
charged with passing upon the sufficiency of a recall petition may
not be challenged after a recall election. 31 This rests upon a presumption that the officer acted according to law and that, in any
event, the voters acquiesced.
A. Sufficiency of the Petition
In Citizens Committee to Recall Rizzo, the majority concluded
that the trial court had, in effect, arrogated the board's discretion as
to determination of the sufficiency of the recall petition. It was
undisputed that 145,448 valid signatures were necessary to satisfy
the charter requirement. The total signatures submitted were
210,806. For purposes of this commentary it is not considered
essential that the administrative and judicial proceedings as to the
sufficiency of the petitions be reviewed in detail. All told, the
board rejected some 121,902 signatures. As appears from the
opinions at the supreme court level, there were two principal categories of identified imperfections on the basis of which signatures
were rejected.
(1) The board rejected 22,159 signatures on the basis that the
affidavits attached to the petition sheets upon which signatures were
subscribed were irregular. The majority disagreed with the trial
court, and upheld the board, in excluding all signatures on sheets
which contained between one-fourth and three-fourths irregular
signatures, some of which were patently forgeries or otherwise
irregular. The rationale was that the board could properly conclude that the affidavits themselves were false and unacceptable in
view of the evident irregularities. This was supported by a negative
inference the court thought the board might properly draw from
29 Dunam v. Ardery, 43 Okla. 619, 143 P. 381 (1914). In another early case
the council of the city had refused to call a recall election on the ground that the
petition and the clerk's certification of its sufficiency were actually insufficient. As is
not uncommon, the process involved the election of a successor to the officer being
recalled. The candidate for the succession sought mandamus to compel the members
of the council to convene and call an election on the basis that the petition was
sufficient. He prevailed, there being no showing of fraud or mistake on the part of
the city clerk. Topping v. Houston, 94 Neb. 445, 143 N.W. 796 (1913).
30 As a general proposition this is elementary and was recognized in the early
recall cases cited supra note 29.
81 Laird v. Hall, 49 N.D. 11, 186 N.W. 284 (1921).
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the failure of the affiants to respond to the board's subpoenas and
explain the discrepancies.82 The dissenting opinions of Justices
Pomeroy and Roberts made the obvious and arresting point that
this involved outright rejection of thousands of signatures that were
valid on their faces and had not been shown to be other than
genuine. The effect, as they noted, was to nullify the participation
of the affected voters in the particular electoral process. 33
The perception that the questioned affidavits might, as a matter
of law, be a basis for rejection of all signatures to which they related
has some rational appeal, but it is blunderbuss in character. The
established fact of considerable irregularities does not engender
overwhelming confidence but neither does it factually establish that
all "signatures" are defective. Instead of ruling all signatures out,
the board was faced with the admittedly difficult task of differentiating between the good and the bad. Plainly one may swear that
A and B are true when only A is. In that case the oath is well
taken as to A.
(2) The Supreme Court overruled the court below, and upheld
the action of the board, in rejecting 115,818 signatures on the
ground that the notarization as to them was by sixteen people associated with the recall movement. These included the attorney for
the recall committee, the coordinator, two salaried employees who
were also petition circulators, and twelve persons who were only
circulators.
The state Notary Public Law provides: "No notary public may
act as such in any transaction in which he is a party directly or
pecuniarily interested." 34 The court not only deemed this provision to apply, but gave it the effect of invalidating all the signatures so notarized, even though the statute itself created no such
sanction. This is hardly more rational than to say that those who
vote for recall in a recall election are serving self-interest in trying
to give political effect to their views and, thus, that their votes
should not be counted, statute or no statute. Is one who votes for
a candidate for public office "directly interested" by that action
alone in the election of that candidate? How can it be said that
32 The lower court noted that the board made no effort to enforce the subpoenas, assumed that the board had halted the inquiry, and refused to draw an

unfavorable inference from the failure of the circulators to appear. Citizens Comm.
to Recall v. Board of Elections, No. 3466 at 46 (C.P. Phila. Co., Sept. 16, 1976),
rev'd, 470 Pa. -, 367 A.2d 232 (1976).
3470 Pa. at - - -, 367 A.2d at 271-72 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting); Id. at
- - -, 367 A.2d at 278-79 (Roberts J., dissenting).
3
4 PA. STAT. Awx. tit. 57, § 165(e) (Purdon 1964).
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there is such interest even if he is .actively working for the election
of a candidate of whom he warmly approves? This is a far cry
from notarization of an act in" which one has a financial or other
interest affecting his individual relationships as distinguished from
interest in expressing political voice. Cases involving notarization
of affidavits of circulators of one's own nomination petition are distinguishable. They involve a political process, it is true, but one
in which the notary is working for his own preferment to be
attended usually by financial elements. A notary public law is
hardly to be perceived as regulation of political activity. For a
court to give a doubtful interpretation of a law as to notarial conflict of interest, unsupported by any express sanction, with so
devastating an impact upon the action of over 100,000 voters in
the political sphere, is nothing short of astounding. It simply makes
no sense. The ruling was plainly in error.
B. The Bearing of State Constitutional Provisions
as to Removal of Public Officers
In holding the recall provisions of the charter unconstitutional
in the state dispensation, the members of the majority rested upon
varying interpretations of article VI, section 4, of the Constitution
of 1874. That section, amended in 1966 and renumbered as
section 7, reads:
All civil officers shall hold their offices on the condition that they behave themselves well while in office,
and shall be removed on conviction of misbehavior in office
or of any infamous crime. Appointed civil officers, other
than judges of the courts of record, may be removed at the
pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed. All civil officers elected by the people, except the
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, members of the General
Assembly and judges of the courts of record, shall be removed by the Governor for reasonable cause, after due
notice and full hearing, on the address of two-thirds of
the Senate. 35
The initial question whether the section applies to local as well as
state officers has long since been determined in the affirmative. 36
35 PA. CoxsT. art. VI,

§ 7.

36 Finley v. McNair, 317 Pa. 278, 176 A. 10 (1935); In re Georges Township
School Directors, 286 Pa. 129, 133 A. 223 (1926); Vesneskd v. Reid, 265 Pa. 328,

108 A. 829 (1919).
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One does not find in the record of the Constitutional Convention
of 1873 specific focus upon the question. There were comments
that simply assumed application to local officers. 37
In the principal opinion, the Chief Justice interpreted the
section to mean that the methods of removal articulated therein
were not exclusive as to non-constitutional officers. He went on to
declare that non-constitutional elective officers were removable only
for cause. The court had committed itself to the first point in an
earlier case.38 Justice Nix, in a separate opinion, declared the
interpretation as to non-constitutional officers insupportable and
insisted that the decision should be overruled. 39 He regarded the
constitutional provisions as being fully preemptive. Justice O'Brien
agreed with this; he saw no distinction between constitutional and
non-constitutional officers.4 ° Thus, as Justice Roberts noted, in dissenting, 41 there was no majority of the seven member court supporting any particular rationale for the decision insofar as it rested
on state constitutional grounds.
If the view of the Chief Justice that the methods of removal
provided in the state constitution applied only to constitutional
officers is correct, why is it that there must be the element of cause
in other methods? As Justice Eagen pointed out,2 this is not expressly laid down, and the court has recognized that an officer may
43
be ousted by abolition of the office at mid-term.
The constitution uses the word "shall." It mandates removal
upon conviction of "misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime"
and removal by the governor on address of two-thirds of the Senate
for reasonable cause after due notice and full hearing. It could be
said that these provisions simply require removal under the stated
circumstances and are not limiting or preemptive language. Just
such an interpretation was given language similar to the first clause
in a recent Georgia case in which a recall statute for a particular
county was involved.44
37 See 5 DEjBAEs OF TBE CONVENTION TO A_ mND THs CONSTruIoN OF PENN-

sxLvArA& 374 (1873)

(remarks of Mr. Buckalew); 7 id. 560 (remarks of Mr.

Buckalew).

SsMilford Township Supervisors' Removal, 291 Pa. 46, 139 A. 623 (1927).
39 470 Pa. at -, - - -, 367 A.2d at 249, 251-54.
40 Id. at-, 367 A.2d at 247.
411d. at -, -, -3 367 A.2d at 273, 287, 299 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at - - -, 367 A.2d at 254-55.

43 Milford Township Supervisors' Removal, 291 Pa. 46, 139 A. 623 (1927).
44 Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975). The case is
discussed in a valuable article by Professor R. Perry Sentell, Jr. Sentell, Remembering Recall in Local Government Law, 10 GA. L. REv. 883, 906-11 (1976).
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III. HOME RuLE
While the four justices who constituted the majority in Citizens
Committee to Recall Rizzo did not agree upon a rationale, they
stood on common ground as to a central element in the case-home
rule. In three opinions they simply ignored the home rule concept
and the constitutional provisions on home rule.45 Not so the
dissenters.
Municipal home rule is not a concept with fixed, unvarying
content. Historically the home rule movement has had two principal thrusts: (a) provision of local unit freedom from legislative
tinkering as to structure, personnel responsibilities and powers and
(b) assurance of freedom from dependence upon enabling legislative action as to structure and authority.46 This puts the matter
rather tersely. It is in the context of familiar American governmental and political experience.
Back in the nineteenth century there was a major attack upon
legislative abuse in relation to local government in the form of
state constitutional limitations upon special legislation. 47 This had
some effect despite extensive ingenious and ingenuous legislative
resort to narrow classifications that were designed to "get around"
the limitations, and relate particularly to the larger urban local
units. Thus, Philadelphia long has been, by population classification, the only Pennsylvania city of the first class. But this development did not respond to the desired extent to the interest in
local autonomy. So today there is some sort of constitutional recognition of municipal home rule in over thirty-five states 48 and
county home rule in over fifteen. 9
It is to be noted here that the home rule movement was given
impetus by a rather strict constructionist judicial attitude concerning the law governing local entities. The central figure in this was
Judge John F. Dillon, the first great American legal expert on
municipal finance, whose major treatise on Municipal Corporations
remains the greatest general legal treatise in the field. The
4

5 The majority was not helped by the briefs, where home rule appears not to

have been argued.
46
Fordham & Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 Omo ST.
L.J. 18 (1948).
47 Pennsylvania was among the states that enacted such limitations. PA. CoNsT.
art. IHI, § 32 (1874, amended 1967).
For a discussion of such abuses, see
J. FonDH _, LoCAL GovmwnmENr L.&w 20 (rev. ed. 1975).
48
See J. FoDnHAm, supra note 47, at 73.
49

Id.
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celebrated Dillon rule of strict construction, 50 is one of the most
quoted passages to be found in the reports of decisions of state courts
of last resort. There is hardly any doubt that the influence of the
Dillon rule upon the state courts strengthened the movement for
constitutional recognition of local home rule.
Traditional home rule theory makes the availability of substantive home rule powers depend upon the adoption of a home
rule charter.51 So conceived, a home rule charter is an instrument
of grant and not of limitation. The governing constitutional provision may make an allocation of power to local units in terms of
authority over local affairs as distinguished from state concerns 52
and may, in addition, place some specific functions and powers beyond legislative control.5 3 The provision may be self-executing with
the effect that local units may adopt home rule charters and exercise
home rule powers without dependence upon implementing
legislation. 4
A variant, which has been articulated in a set of Suggested
Constitutional Provisions for Home Rule by this writer, makes a
direct constitutional devolution of substantive home rule powers
5
It
dependent only upon the adoption of a home rule charter.6
does not place any substantive power or function beyond legislative control by general law. Under this approach a home rule
charter is an instrument of limitation and not of grant.
The first Pennsylvania constitutional response was relatively
late. It came in 1922. The amendment provided for home rule
for cities:
Cities may be chartered whenever a majority of the electors
of any town or borough having a population of at least ten
thousand shall vote at any general or municipal election in
favor of the same. Cities, or cities of any particular class,
may be given the right and power to frame and adopt
their own charters and to exercise the powers and authority
of local self-government, subject, however, to such restrictions, limitations, and regulations, as may be imposed
by the Legislature. 6
50 J. DuzoN, MucnPAL ConpoRTioNs §237 (5th ed. 1911) quoted in
J. ForDHAm,
51 See
Hoim5 RurL
2 See,

supranote 47, at 58.
generally H. McB~wn THE
(1916).
e.g., Orno CoNsT. art. XVIII.
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53 Id.

54 Id.
55 Fordham, Model Constitutional Provisions for Municipal Home Rule (1953),
reprintedin J. FoaAM, supra note 47, at 76-84.
SO PA. CoNsr. art. XV, § 1 (1922, repealed 1968).
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Obviously this was not self-executing as to either charter-making or
substantive powers. Implementing legislation was not enacted until
1949. 57 It was applicable only to cities of the first class of which
Philadelphia is, by. population definition, the -only one. The Philadelphia Home Rule Charter was adopted pursuant to this act in
April, 1951.
Since the 1922 home rule amendment is amendatory of the
Constitution of 1874, it must, as an elementary rational matter, be
regardedias controlling over provisions of the Constitution of 1874
with which it is inconsistent. The question here is whether the
home rule grant, as effectuated by the enabling act, empowered the
city to provide for recall of elective officers.
The reference in the 1922 amendment to framing and adoption
of charters is very general. How broad is it as to governmental
structure and personnel? One suggests that it is very broad in keeping with a purpose to pave the way for cities to be enabled to have
free range in their governmental arrangements. 8 Thus, there is
constitutional basis here for a home rule charter to provide for
recall under general enabling legislation. The only substantial
question is whether the 1949 enabling act imposed governing restrictions that exclude recall. Certainly it did not do so expressly.
Section 17 of that act provides in part:
The charter of any city adopted or amended in accordance
with this act may provide for a form or system of municipal government and for the exercise of any and all
powers relating to its municipal functions, not inconsistent
with the Constitution of the United States or of this Commonwealth, to the full extent that the General Assembly
may legislate in reference thereto as to cities of the first
class, and with like effect, and the city may enact ordinances, rules and regulations necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other
powers vested in the city by the charter it adopts or by this
or any other law. 9
Here the first question is whether the limitation as to extent
of legislative power to act applies to governmental form or system
as well as substantive powers. It is open to that interpretation but
tit. 53, § 13101 (Purdon 1957).
It seems fair to say that provision for adoption of home rule "charters" contemplates as a basic component the erecting of a structure of government, because
that is a chbracteristic element of a charter government.
59PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13131 (Purdon 1957) (footnotes omitted).
57 PA. STAT. ANN.
58
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that is not an end to this matter. As this writer perceives the 1922
home rule amendment, the legislature derives from that amendment
plenary power to enable cities to adopt their own charters. This is
basic. The legislature is fully empowered to effectuate the amendment. The enabling act makes a plenary grant as to form and
system of government subject, at most, to largely substantive power
limitations in section 18, which do not have any bearing on recall.6 0
Thus, the city had power to provide by home rule charter for recall.
The enabling act expressly treated power to amend a home rule
,charter on the same footing as authority to adopt such a charter in
the first instance. Thus, there was no evident bar to changing the
pattern of municipal offices by charter amendment in a way that
might even eliminate an existing office at mid-term. If this be so,
how may one logically treat local charter provision for recall any
differently?
There is an early decision in the State of Washington, Hilzinger
-v. Gillman,"' duly noted in the dissenting opinions of Justices
Pomeroy and Roberts, 2 that upheld recall as a political process in
a constitutional dispensation not unlike that involved in Citizens
Committee to Recall Rizzo. The state constitution provided as to
officer removal that "[a]ll officers not liable to impeachment shall be
subject to removal for misconduct or malfeasance in office in such
manner as may be provided by law." 63 That instrument provided
for city home rule in these terms: "[a]ny city containing a population of twenty thousand inhabitants, or more, shall be permitted to
frame a charter for its own government, consistent with and subject
," 64 The suit was
to the Constitution and laws of this state . ..
.one by a councilman to enjoin the city clerk of the City of Everett
from certifying to council the sufficiency of a recall petition. Plain-tiff contended that there was lack of constitutional or statutory
.authority for recall. As to consistency with the constitutional pro-visions concerning removal, the court observed that there was no
-real inconsistency between provision for removal for cause and independent provision for removal by political action, such as recall.
cO The limitations of'§ 18, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13133 (Purdon 1957), have
'een considered to relate only to "substantive matters of State-wide concern."
lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 379, 93 A.2d 834, 845 (1953).
6156 Wash. 228, 105 P. 471 (1909).
62470 Pa. at -, 367 A.2d at 266 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting); id. at -, 367
-A.2d at 286 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
03 WAsH CoNsT. art. V, § 3.
04 Id. art. XI, § 10 (1889, amended 1964).
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On the home rule issue, the court wrote:
The people of the city of Everett in framing the charter
intended that their representatives should be held strictly
amenable to both the existing and changing public sentiment on all local measures, and that if the official conduct
of any elective officer failed at any time to so respond, he
was subject to recall if the majority of the electorate in his
district so determined. The [plaintiff] accepted the trust
subject to this power in his constituency, and the duration
of his term of office is dependent upon the wish of the
majority as expressed at the polls. The removal sought is
not of the character provided for in the constitution.
Whether the interests of the city will be better subserved
by a ready obedience to public sentiment than by a
courageous adherence to the views of the individual officer
on questions of public concern is a political, and not a
legal question. 65
It is to be noted that there is a Minnesota precedent which
lends ambivalent support to the Citizens Committee to Recall Rizzo
position that the general constitutional provision as to removal of
public officers for malfeasance or nonfeasance exacts that that
element be present in the recall process.6 In that case the court
declared that it was necessary that a recall petition, under a home
rule charter that called for statement of grounds for removal in a
recall petition, set out,grounds that constituted malfeasance or nonfeasance. The court expressly recognized that the final determination would be made by the voters. This was rather incongruous
because it involved no system of pleading, proof or adjudication.
But it did not outlaw the recall.
Perhaps the most astounding aspect of the instant case is the
gratuitous action of the majority in laying it down that recall could
not constitutionally be provided by a home rule charter under the
home rule amendment of 1968. Article IX, section 2 reads:
Municipalities shall have the right and power to frame and
adopt home rule charters. Adoption, amendment or re65 56 Wash. at 235, 105 P. at 474.
66
Jacobsen v. Nagel, 255 Minn. 300, 96 N.W.2d 569 (1959). See also
Williams v. State, 197 Ala. 40, 72 So. 330 (1916) (constitutional provision for
removal of local officers for cause by judicial action precludes removal by recall).
The reasoning in the latter case is certainly open to question, The majority seemed
to find great significance in the distinction between shortening the term of an office
prospectively and ousting an incumbent by recall. The merit of such a distinction
is doubtful given that a nonconstitutional office is subject to legislative abolition at
any time.
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peal of a home rule charter shall be by referendum. The
General Assembly shall provide the procedure by which a
home rule charter may be framed and its adoption, amendment or repeal presented to the electors. If the General
Assembly does not so provide, a home rule charter or a
procedure for framing and presenting a home rule charter
may be presented to the electors by initiative or by the
governing body of the municipality. A municipality
which has a home rule charter may exercise any power or
perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by
its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any
time.

7

Plainly the direct constitutional grant of power is self-executing.
The section embraces the writer's home rule theory. Neither enabling nor implementing legislation is required. There is reserved
to the legislature power to deny to a home rule charter unit authority to exercise a power or function, but there is no express
reservation of that sort as to governmental structure and administration. Thus, home rule power as to the latter appears to be plenary.
The legislature had not undertaken, in any event, to deny a home
rule charter unit power to provide for recall.
The result for Philadelphia, after the ruling of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, was not only that the particular effort to recall
failed, but also that there was left no constitutional basis for any
further effort, however impeccable the conformity with the prescribed recall process. The opinion of the court and the concurring
opinions do not even cite the 1968 amendment, let alone refer to its
text and consider the meaning and effect of its language with specific
reference to the nature and scope of home rule powers directly
granted by this constitutional amendment.
One is brought to make the observation that the court's brave
talk about due process in putting the quietus upon recall is the antithesis of its treatment of general function units in the state other
than Philadelphia. They had no hearing on the important constitutional issue that the court went on to settle for them. What
renders this all the more distressing is that the court had no discernible basis for departing from the wise policy of confronting
constitutional questions only when genuinely necessary to the disposition of a case. As a matter of basic fairness, as well as proper
performance of the judicial function, the court's action deserves no
better mark than a failing grade.
67
( PA. CoNsr. art. IX, § 2. "Municipality" is defined by the Pennsylvania
Constitution to cover "a county." Id. art. IX, § 14.
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There is an interesting question as to whether the 1968 home
rule amendment is to be considered as having validated the recall
provisions of the Philadelphia home rule charter, in any event.
Certainly validating effect could not be denied had the 1968 amendment contained express validating language.
The home rule provision in the Pennsylvania Constitutionarticle XV, section 1-that under which the Philadelphia Home Rule
Charter was adopted-was repealed in the process of adoption of the
1968 amendment. The home rule grant is in article IX, section 2,
of the largely amended constitution. The repeal was dealt with in a
schedule. Neither in the new home rule section nor in the schedule
was there any express saving clause or validating language.
The home rule charter law enacted in 1972 is by way of implementation of the 1968 amendment.6
It is expressly provided in
the act that it does not apply to any city or county of the first class. 69
The upshot of all this appears to be that Philadelphia is operatirig
under the broad 1968 grant which must be, in effect, a validation of
its charter, there being no other constitutional source of authority.

IV. THiE FruURE

One makes the obvious suggestion that the Constitution of
Pennsylvania be so amended as to provide a legal basis for the recall
of local elective officials in the executive and legislative branches.
The choice should be there if home rule is to be broadly meaningful.
In Philadelphia a mayor is elected for a four-year term. This
is a substantial period that affords time for significant leadership
and service. It is also a long period to have in office a mayor who
is not measuring up to the expectations of the voters. Surely there
is basis for serious doubt that the overhang of the electorate's recall
option would render a mayor of any quality too cautious to assert
vigorous leadership.
If notions of local autonomy embrace anything, they comprehend local selection of local officers. This rationally covers not
only initial selection but also continuance in office. This is not to
say that the recall has an indispensable quality. It is simply to
respect local voice in local government.
6sHome Rule Charter and Option Plans Law of 1972, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, §§ 1-101 to 1-1309 (Purdon 1974).
69 Id. § 1-1301.

